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SECTION I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. TYPES OF HAZARDS 
Launching a l iquid propelled rocket i s  hazardous because of the copious quantities 
of propellants it carries. Propellant hazards can be classified into two main categories: 
(1) those affecting personnel (2) those affecting hardware. Hazards affecting personnel 
may be classed as those of toxicity, suffocation, and fire and explosion. 
B. TOXIC GASES AND SUFFOCANTS 
Toxic propellants of specific interest to NASA are nitrogen tetroxide, elemental 
fluorine, and the hydrazines; such as , hydrazine, monomenthylhydrazine, and unsymme- 
trical dimethylhydrazine. O f  these, only hydrazine base propellants present fire and 
blast hazards, while al l  of them present dermal and respiratory hazards. In enclosed, 
inhabited spaces, there exists the possibility of anoxia from dilution of atmospheric 
oxygen by leakage of high pressure helium and nitrogen. 
I 
Each hazard requires a different detection subsystem, since it is impossible for a 
single detector to operate satisfactorily in many different atmospheres. 
C. MALFUNCTION CHARACTERISTICS 
Many failure modes are possible at a launch or test faci l i ty. Except for uncontroll- 
, able abort, a l l  failure modes are qualitatively, i f  not quantitatively, similar. Typical 
propellant rrialfunction characteristics of rocket ground support equipment (GSE) are l isted 
fo I I ow i ng : 
1. Location - point external sources 
2. Location - single point failure 
3.  Gas concentrations - wide range 
4. Gas concentrations - rapid fluctuations 
5. Time release pattern - discontinuous or sporadic 
6. Phases - gas or liquid, present simultaneously 
7. Temperatures - wide range of  release 
Experience with both bal l ist ic weapons and manned space vehicles has shown that 
the majority o f  accidental releases o f  toxic liquids and gases occurs during active pro- 
pellant transfer and flow operations. The probability of r :Jellant release following i ts 
transfer i s  quite low until the vehicle tanks are pressurrz>J prior to flight. The majority 
of  recorded flight-weight hardware malfunctions are single goint failures such as fitting, 
point, and seal leaks. The leak or spi l l  probability from a passive ground storage vessel, 
even under pressure, is  almost negligible. 
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SECTION II 
P H I LOS 0 PH Y OF I N ST RUM E NT AT ION 
Concepts for monitoring toxicants cannot be detached from overal I system requirements 
and constraints. The chronology o f  system development using state-of-the-art techniques 
includes: (1) hazard recognition, (2) identification of system requirements, (3 )  preliminary 
hardware testing and evaluation, (4) specifications and hardware procurement , and (5) hard- 
ware improvement and/or modification. 
Hazards must be recognized at the appropriate management organizational level t o  
cr i t ical ly evaluate and just i fy action. Not only is high level management approval necessary 
to  just i fy the high cost of toxic monitoring and control systems, but considerable engineering 
effort i s  also required, early in the program, to determine technical feasibi l i ty. 
Two important decisions must be made during the requirements identification period: 
(1) Should area or point detection be used? (2) Should displays be local or remote? 
The safety policy at the John F. Kennedy Space Center i s  that area detection be used 
in the blockhouse air-conditioning systems, unpressurized control buildings, test cel ls, and 
spacecraft white rooins; and that point detection be used when considerable personnel act ivi ty 
w i l l  take place around highly pressurized or fragile equipment. In such instances, sensors 
should be mounted directly on pipes or valves. 
It i s  recommended that data be transmitted and visual ly displayed at a central control 
point such as the control room or blockhouse, with a direct communication link to  an audible 
warning system. This philosophy i s  consistent with the concept of removing personnel from 
possible hazards. For passive GSE at a support facil i ty, a duplicate display, slaved to the 
unit at the primary control point, may be located in the secondary faci l i ty control center. 
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SECTION I l l  
TOXIC GAS MONITORING SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
A. GENERAL 
A monitoring system collects information on the cause and effects of a sp i l l  or leak 
but does not control the resulting hazards. Point detectors measure the causes; area 
detectors determine effects, such as gas concentration. When a Red condition is  detected, 
the decision to  ignore the malfunction (if noncritical), evacuate the site, or ini t iate 
countermeasures must be made. Countermeasures can be: inerting purges , switching to 
alternate systems, offloading propellants, depressurizing, activating suppression systems, 
etc. It is  important to note that the decision to override or countermeasure the malfunction 
rests joint ly with the chief test conductor and the pad safety supervisor, not with the hazard 
monitoring system operators. The cause-effect-decision-control relationships are shown 
in  Figure 1. For Apollo/Saturn V, an active monitoring system i s  required from T-180 
hours t o  T+24 hours to support the prelaunch countdown and deservicing in  the event of a 
mission scrub. Hazardous conditions are not uniformly severe during th is  204-hour 
period. The variable cr i t ical i ty of  operations for a nominal Apollo mission is  shown i n  
Figure 2. 
The installation and checkout time required for activation i s  also a variable item. 
Communication and display installation may precede launch by several months, while 
sensors and transducers are installed and system calibration is  conducted about 1 week be- 
fore activation. 
B. SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
To meet automated launch system requirements, a toxic gas monitoring system wi l l  
consist essentially of three basic subsystems as shown following and i n  Figure 3.  These 
subsystems are explained i n  detail in succeeding sections. 
1. Data Collection Subsystems 
Sensors and Transducers 
Amplifiers and Contact Meters or Switches 
Alarm Relays and Circuits 
2. Data Transmission Subsystem 
Oscillators and Coders (Frequency Shift Keying) 
Transm iss ion Hard1 ines 
Decoders 
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FIGURE 3.  MONITORING SUBSYSTEM LOGIC 
3 .  Data Display Consoles 
Subsidiary Operations Display 
Operations Safety Display 
C. THE SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE 
The l i fe  cycle of a monitoring system extends from activation of equipment through 
test, operation, termination, deactivation, maintenance, and refurbishment. Rel iabi l i ty  
is  paramount during activation and testing, and durability i s  important during maintenance 
and refurbishment. 
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SECTION I V  
DATA COLLECTION SUBSYSTEMS 
A. GENERAL 
Sensors or transducers produce electrical pulses in the presence of toxic vapors. 
These pulses are usually i n  the mil l ivolt  or microvolt range and generally require amplifi- 
cation at the transducer. Th is  w i l l  magnify and/or condition the signal for transmission. 
Transducers based on physical/chemical principles are most often used as point detectors. 
In some instances, however, area or scanning devices such as ultrasonic microphones and 
long path infrared techniques have been used. Ideally, gas sensors should meet the speci- 
fications shown i n  Table 1. 
TABLE I 
S ENS OR SPEC I FlCATl ONS 
Primary Consideration Specification 
Configuration Small, simple, and rugged 
Operating Environment 
Range of Sensitivity 
Capable of withstanding noise, vibra- 
tion, humidityrand thermal stresses 
120 to 160 db at 20 cps 
40 to 100 percent relative humidity 
-40 to  1 4 O O F  
Response between 
1X to l O O X  TLV* low range 
l O O X  t o  l O O O X  T L V  high range 
Response Time to 90 Percent Full 
Scale Approximately 60 seconds 
Recovery Time to 10 Percent of  
Peak Approximate 70 seconds 
Zero Drift Less tha,i I 3.5X T L V  
over 9-day period i n  the absence 
of  shock or vibration 
*Threshold L im i t  Value 
7 
Primary Consideration 
Fai l -safe Features 
Secondary Consideration 
Operation Principle 
Lower Sensitivity 
Specificity of Fuel Detectors 
Specif ici ty o f  Oxidizer Detectors 
Orientation 
E I ectri cal Output 
E I ectrical Input 
Acc u racy 
TABLE I (Continued) 
SENSOR SPEC I Fl CAT1 ONS 
S peci f icat ion 
Local and remote circuit check 
capabi I i ty 
Local and remote alarm capability 
Specification 
Physical or chemical 
0.5X T L V  
50 : l  versus other fuels and solvents 
50:1 versus other oxidizers 
Independent of position 
Analog dc/converti ble to 
digital dc 
None or l l O v  ac 
* 25 percent at fu l l  scale 
B. SENSORSANDDETECTORS 
Table 2 shows a partial l i s t  of sensors and detectors that can be packaged to  meet 
NASA specifications. It i s  desirable that the transducer perform when overloaded with- 
out automatically cutting off or switching, and that the output signal remain at maximum 
when swamped. Transducers may be packaged with or without integral prime movers. 
KSC policy dictates that air pumps be eliminated where possible. When sensors are re- 
quired in air-conditioning ducts or closed spaces, natural diffusion w i l l  carry gases to 
the sensors, thereby eliminating air pumps. However, i n  applications subject to wind 
gusts, accurate air or gas samples cannot be obtained without an air pump. 
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Most transducers produce an analog direct current signal proportional to incident 
gas concentration. Instrumentation used both local Iy and remotely, should have appropriate 
amplification to enable the transducer to drive a contact meter. The meter then provides a 
local visual analog reading and switching to trigger local internal or remote relays. For 
instrumentation used remotely, only a variable threshold go/no-go output i s  required thus 
eliminating transmission of analog signals over long wires. Such remote detectors actuate 
alarm relays at the control point and must certify go before unprotected personnel are 
allowed back into hazardous areas. 
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SECTION V 
THE ACTUAL NETWORK 
A.  SENSOR LOCATION 
The network i s  best understood by looking at typical sensor subsystems. Figure 4 
depicts the toxic leak detection subsystem proposed for the Saturn V mobile service 
Structure (MSS). For semiremote Operations from the base of the MSS, data and control 
signals can be transmitted over hardlines without amplifiers or repeaters external to  the 
sensors. In  this case, the control point i s  only 350 feet from the furthest detector. The 
oxygen depletion subsystems for the mobile latincher (ML) and the pad terminal connect- - 
itig rooms (PTCR) are somewhat simpler than the toxic leak detection subsystem (Figure 5) 
for the MSS. The oxygen detectors are passive and rely on the closed circuit air-condi- 
tioning system to  move adequate air past the sensors to measure gas concentrations. In  
these applications,the detectors are located at or i n  the air return ducts. 
B .  NUMBER OF SENSORS 
The toxic gas detection subsystem wi l l  require approximately 15 sensors per launch 
pad. F i ve  of these sensors w i l l  be located at the upper level valve boxes and ten w i l l  be 
located at the conditioning service units. The oxygen depletion subsystems w i l l  consist 
of approximately nine sensors per pad; six in the base of the ML and three in the PTCR. 
C. DATA TRANSMISSION 
For remote operation, the signals from the detectors at the launch pad must be trans- 
mitted 3-1/2 miles to  the Launch Control Center (LCC). This digital data relay and test 
command transmission i s  accomplished by a technique similar to  high speed telegraphy. 
This  technique i s  called frequency shift keying (FSK). FSK i s  a digital modulation 
technique wherein opening or closing a contact causes a discrete frequency shift of a 
carrier wave between two predetermined values. Each data or command channel i s  binary 
coded within a 20-bit segment of  the carrier signal. Thus, with a scan rate of 800 bits 
per second, 40 digital information channels may be transmitted over a single narrow band 
telephone pair. A diagram of this FSK data transmission system i s  shown in Figure 6. 
D. DATA DISPLAYS 
The decoded signals are displayed visually and audibiy i n  the LCC.  The transmitted 
data are displayed on logic panels i n  appropriate operations consoles located on the second 
floor of the LCC, (Figure 7). When a leak is  indicated by a no-go red l ight on this 
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15 
subsidiary operations console, the operator presses the confirm indicator. This sends a 
command signal back over the digital transmission system, which init iates an amplifier 
continuity test at the MSS. I f  the sensor output amplifier i s  functioning properly, a 
second red l ight wi l l  confirm the propellant leak. The operator w i l l  then attempt to verify 
the extent of the malfunction by focusing the operational television system on the indicated 
trouble spot. Simultaneous with th is confirmation and verification, the pad safety super- 
visor in the vehicle fir ing room i s  advised of the suspected malfunction by a signal on his 
summary display. 
Toxic gas and oxygen depletion functions are only two of the many summary functions 
displayed on this Operations Safety Console (see figure 8) .  The Operations Safety Console 
i s  at al l  times visible to the test supervisor and advises him of the overall safety status 
of launch pad personnel. 
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APPENDIX 
ABBREVIATIONS 
APS 
CM 
CM/SM 
HMS 
LEM 
RCS 
SPS 
Auxil iary propulsion system 
Command module 
Command module/service module 
Hazardous monitoring system 
Lunar excursion module 
Reaction control system 
Space propulsion system 
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